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 Executive Summary 
 
In the face of rising congestion on the nation’s road system, policymakers have explored 
ways to reduce travel delays.  One approach has been to allocate reserved lanes—called high-
occupancy-vehicle (HOV) lanes—to vehicles carrying two or more people.  A recent innovation 
is to allow solo drivers to use the HOV lanes if they pay a toll.  These so-called high-occupancy-
toll (HOT) lanes can be found in Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, and Minneapolis and are 
under consideration in several other urban areas. In this paper, we argue that HOV and HOT 
lanes sacrifice efficiency by failing to price all lanes.  Moreover, we show that it is possible to set 
prices on all lanes that improve on the efficiency of HOV and HOT policies and by catering to 
motorists’ varying preferences, can meet the test of political acceptability. 
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Differentiated Road Pricing, Express Lanes and Carpools: 
Exploiting Heterogeneous Preferences in Policy Design 
 
Kenneth A. Small, Clifford Winston and Jia Yan 
 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. highway system, largely constructed with public funds from the fuel tax, could 
be characterized as a public good if it were rarely congested.  But like many public goods that 
are available at little or no charge, its quality has deteriorated with the intensity of use.  Today, 
the nation’s road system has turned into a “tragedy of the commons” as road users experience 
nearly 4 billion hours of annual delay (Schrank and Lomax, 2005).  Of course, even an efficient 
road system would force motorists to incur some delays, but the current level is regarded by most 
observers as excessive.  
Historically, the public has had a status-quo bias against economists’ recommendations to 
use the price mechanism to reduce congestion.
1  Policymakers have therefore pursued other 
approaches such as allocating reserved lanes to vehicles carrying two or more people. But recent 
evidence indicates that these “high-occupancy-vehicle” (HOV) lanes sometimes carry fewer 
people than general-purpose lanes, attract many family members who would ride together 
anyhow, and shift some travelers from vanpools or buses to low-occupancy carpools (Orski 
2001, Poole and Balaker 2005).  As a result, HOV lanes are losing favor among state 
departments of transportation.  
A recent innovation is to fill the reserved capacity not used by HOVs with solo drivers 
willing to pay a toll.  These so-called “high-occupancy-toll” (HOT) lanes can be found in the Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Houston, and Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan areas, and they are 
currently under consideration in other areas including Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, and 
Washington, DC. 
HOT lanes appeal to a broad set of motorists who are sufficiently inconvenienced by 
congestion to pay a sizable toll to travel on less congested lanes, either daily or as dictated by 
their schedules. Although the adoption of HOT-lanes in some urban areas indicates that the 
public is no longer opposed to all forms of congestion pricing, HOT lanes are questionable on 
                                            
1  Small, Winston, and Evans (1989), Mohring (1999), and the papers in Santos, ed. (2004) provide recent 
discussions of road pricing.  2 
   
welfare grounds for two reasons.  First, motorists continue to impose high congestion costs on 
each other because most of the highway is unpriced.  Second, the express lanes are still 
underutilized because a big price differential exists between the two roadways (Small and Yan, 
2001).  Indeed, simulations show that HOT lanes sometimes lower welfare compared with 
keeping all lanes in general use, particularly if they are priced high enough to allow motorists to 
travel at approximately free-flow speeds—a condition that is achieved to promote the service 
advantages of the lanes among the public. 
In short, HOV and HOT policies do not appear to have answered the long-standing call 
for efficient yet politically viable road pricing policies.  In this paper, we seek to identify such 
policies by analyzing the behavior of motorists traveling on California State Route 91 (SR91) in 
Orange County. These travelers have the option of traveling solo on the general lanes, paying a 
toll to use the HOT express lanes, or forming a carpool to use the express lanes at a discount.  
Because travelers are likely to vary in their preferences for speedy and reliable travel, we model 
the situation accounting for both observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity.
2  We find 
that users of SR91 have high average values of travel time and travel-time reliability, and that the 
distributions of these values exhibit considerable dispersion. 
We then show that by designing differentiated pricing schemes for general and express 
lanes that cater to such varying preferences, it is possible to capture some of the efficiency that 
HOV and HOT policies sacrifice while generating welfare disparities among road users that are 
not only smaller than more efficient pricing policies generate but small enough to be comparable 
to policies that have actually passed the test of politically acceptability in a few urban areas.   
 
2. Empirical Model of Travel Choices 
California State Route 91 is a major limited-access expressway used heavily by long-
distance commuters.  A 10-mile stretch in Orange County includes four free lanes and two 
express lanes in each direction.  Motorists who wish to use the express lanes must set up a 
financial account and carry an electronic transponder to pay a toll, which varies hourly according 
to a preset schedule.  Carpools of three or more could use the express lanes at a 50 percent 
                                            
2 Previous empirical studies that allow for heterogeneous preferences among motorists include Calfee, Winston, and 
Stempski (2001), Hensher (2001), Jiang and Morikawa (2004), Steimetz and Brownstone (2005), Hess, Bierlaire, 
and Polak (2005), and Small, Winston, and Yan (2005a). Simulation studies incorporating heterogeneity to analyze 
pricing scenarios include Small and Yan (2001), Verhoef and Small (2004), and De Palma and Lindsey (2004). 3 
   
discount at the time covered by our surveys.
3  Unlike the regular lanes, the express lanes have no 
entrances or exits between their end points. 
We assembled a data set from surveys of travelers on the corridor, describing the lane 
choices they actually make and the choices they would hypothetically make in different 
circumstances.  In an earlier paper using the same data (Small, Winston, and Yan 2005a), we 
modeled motorists’ lane choice only. Here we model three simultaneous decisions by motorists: 
(i) whether to acquire a transponder, which gives them the flexibility to use the express lanes 
whenever they desire; (ii) whether to travel on the express or free lanes for the trip in question; 
and (iii) how many people to travel with in their vehicle. We include transponder acquisition as a 
separate choice because it captures a legal requirement to use the express lanes.  Whether a 
motorist decides to meet the requirement may depend on other characteristics than those 
explaining day-to-day travel choices, and may cause more persistence in travel behavior than 
would otherwise be the case.  We include vehicle occupancy so that we can explore the effects of 
various policies that depend on it. 
The three choices are assumed conditional on related choices including travel mode (car 
vs. public transport), residential location, and time of day of travel.  In our context, mode choice 
is unimportant because public transportation has a very small share of travelers on the corridor 
served by SR91.  Residential location may indeed be important, but it is a longer-run response 
that introduces complexities that are difficult to capture in a tractable empirical model.  We 
would like to model the choice of what time of day people travel but are unable to do so because 
we lack information on how congestion varies on roads that people use besides the SR91 study 
corridor. We describe later some statistical tests that indicate that our results are not particularly 
sensitive to our assumption that travel occurs at a given time of day. 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we combine data that describe motorists’ actual 
decisions for their morning commute with data indicating hypothetical choices between the 
express and free lanes under varying travel conditions. This strategy permits us to extract 
information about the distribution of preferences that would otherwise be impossible to extricate 
from other random influences on behavior. The mechanism at work is that an individual who 
                                            
3 Starting late May 2003, these carpools could travel for free except weekday afternoons outbound from 4-6 p.m., 
when they receive a 50 percent discount. Current information is available on the Orange County Transportation 
Authority’s “91 Express Lanes” website at http://www.91expresslanes.com. 
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answered the hypothetical questions provides responses for up to eight different scenarios; 
hence, we can effectively infer that individual’s preferences through his unique pattern of 
responses to tradeoffs among cost, time, and reliability.  We estimate common coefficients of the 
tradeoffs that are shared among individuals and coefficients of the tradeoffs that vary among 
individuals, enabling us to measure the key distributions of the value of time and value of 
reliability in our sample. 
 Formally,  traveler  n faces a choice whether to have a transponder (T) or not (N); whether 
to travel on a general (free) lane (G) or express lane (X); and whether to travel with 1, 2, or 3 
people in the vehicle (where 3 means three or more).  The three choice dimensions define 
2x2x3=12 alternatives, but only nine of them are available because a highway traveler must have 
a transponder to use the express lane, thereby eliminating combinations NX1, NX2, and NX3. 
 Following  standard  discrete-choice modeling, we specify the indirect utility of 
travelernchoosing an alternative j to be random: 
    jn n jn jn X U ε β + = .        ( 1 )  
In this equation, Xjn is a vector of attributes associated with alternative j including the toll, travel 
time, and reliability that apply to the traveler’s trip; βn is a vector of parameters that captures the 
traveler’s  preferences for those attributes; and εjn is an error term capturing unobserved 
influences.  We measure preference heterogeneity by allowing parameter vector βn to vary across 
individuals according to both observed characteristics and random (i.e. unobserved) influences: 
n n n W µ γ β + = .      ( 2 )  
In this equation, Wn is a vector of explanatory variables relating to traveler n, while µn is a vector 
of random variables; γ is a vector of parameters, to be estimated statistically, describing how 
preferences depend on observed characteristics. The random terms µn are assumed to be 
independent normal random variables, with variances to be estimated. Thus the terms Wnγ and µn 
describe observed and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively, in preferences toward travel 
characteristics. 
 If  εjn in (1) were independently distributed according to identical extreme-value 
distributions, then equations (1) and (2) would constitute a conventional mixed-logit model 
where each choice probability can be expressed as a standard multinomial logit choice 5 
   
probability (conditional on βn), integrated over the distribution of µn (which determines βn).
4  
Our model is more complicated because we specify the structure of εjn to account for certain 
special features of the data. One is the decision structure inherent in our choice alternatives; 
another, which we describe later, is that we merge our data from several sources. 
  As noted, the decision structure involves three choice dimensions. Thus it is unlikely that 
the alternative-specific preferences εjn for the nine permitted alternatives are independent of each 
other. Rather, a natural approach is to specify random preferences for groups of alternatives as 
described by Brownstone and Train (1999).
5  We let εjn include four distinct preferences: for a 
transponder (T), for the express lane (X), for a two-person carpool (H2), and for a three-person 

















j jn η ν ν ν ν ε + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =
3 3 2 2      (3) 
where 
T
j ∆  denotes a dummy variable equal to one if alternative j is one of those characterized by 
a transponder, and so forth. The four variables 
k
n ν  are independent normal random variables, 
each with mean zero and a standard deviation σ




HOV.)  The remaining random terms, ηjn in (3), are assumed to be independent random 
variables (one for each alternative) with identical extreme-value distributions, just like in a logit 
model. 
  Naturally, one can expect to estimate the distribution of only a few of the many 
behavioral parameters contained in a model like this. We choose two key parameters, which 
means there are two components of µn in equation (2) with non-zero variances. One (
Time
n µ ) is 
part of the coefficient of travel time, while the other (
l Re
n µ ) is part of the coefficient of 
(un)reliability. Their standard deviations, to be estimated, are denoted σ
Time and σ
Rel.  
To summarize the stochastic part of the model, we specify six independent normal 
random terms (ν’s and µ’s) with five distinct unknown standard deviations (σ’s) to be estimated. 
                                            
4 Small and Winston (1999) and Train (2003) contain expositions of the logit and mixed-logit models. The 
(normalized) extreme-value distribution for a random variable ε is defined by the probability Prob[ε≤x] = exp(e
-x). 
5 An alternative approach would be to use a nested-logit specification. The approach here is more flexible, is 
typically better behaved numerically, and is easier to implement given that we are using mixed logit. 
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We define the value of travel time (VOT) and value of reliability (VOR) for individual n 
as the ratios of marginal utilities of travel time and reliability, respectively, to the marginal utility 























Re β , and 
Cost
n β  are the coefficients of travel time, reliability of travel time, and toll 
in equation (1). These values depend on observables Wn and random components µn through     
equation (2).  
 
3. Data Set and Econometric Issues 
We combine survey data from three samples of people traveling between 4:00 am and 
10:00 am on the California State Route 91 corridor westbound who have the option of using the 
express lanes.  The surveys were taken over a 10-month period in 1999 and 2000.  The first 
survey was a telephone survey generating 435 observations pertaining to actual travel on a 
particular day, conducted by researchers at California Polytechnic State University at San Luis 
Obispo (CalPoly) with our participation (Sullivan et al. 2000).   Thus it consists of revealed 
preference (RP) data. 
The second and third samples are from a two-stage mail survey collected by us through 
the Brookings Institution.  The initial stage collected RP data from 79 respondents on actual trips 
taken during a week of travel, while a follow-up stage presented to each respondent eight stated 
preference (SP) scenarios.
6  In each SP scenario, the respondent was asked to choose between 
two otherwise identical routes with specified hypothetical tolls, travel times, and probabilities of 
delay; an illustrative scenario is presented in the appendix.  The SP sample contains 78 
respondents, who generated 610 observations; 54 of these people also answered the RP 
                                            
6 The Brookings RP sample actually contains information for all commuting trips made within the survey week, 
which could be treated as separate observations. However, 87 percent of the respondents made the same choice 
every day and nearly all of the others varied on only one day.  So we simplify, with little information loss, by 
creating a binary response variable equal to one if the respondent chose the express lanes for half or more of the 
days reported.  We tried variants of this response variable with virtually no changes in results.    7 
   
questions.  Detailed descriptions of the samples are presented in Small, Winston, and Yan 
(2005b). 
By constructing a sample that contains both RP and SP observations, we can overcome 
the main drawbacks of each type of data.  The use of RP data is often hindered by strong 
correlations among travel cost, time, and reliability; whereas SP data raise concerns about 
whether the behavior exhibited in hypothetical situations applies to actual choices.  By 
specifying some parameters to be identical and others different in the utility functions generating 
RP and SP choices, we can improve the precision in estimating common parameters (due to low 
correlations designed into the SP questions) while allowing for expected behavioral differences 
in other parameters. 
Table 1 presents some statistics on socioeconomic variables and trip distance. The 
Brookings RP sample appears to represent well the population characteristics of the SR91 
catchment area, tracking census information for the two relevant counties except for household 
income—which, naturally, is higher for our respondents because most of them are commuters.
7  
We estimate the average wage rate to be $23/hour.
8  The CalPoly sample has higher household 
incomes and shorter trip distances than the Brookings samples, evidently being drawn from a 
smaller and more affluent geographical area. These sampling differences should not affect our 
parameter estimates because our model includes income and trip distance as explanatory 
variables. 
Table 2 presents the choice shares of the nine alternatives associated with each RP 
sample.  We observe a difference among carpooling propensities between the CalPoly and 
Brookings samples, with many fewer carpools in the latter. To better understand the difference, 
the CalPoly sample is disaggregated into four subsamples representing different ways of finding 
respondents (Sullivan et al. 2000). The “Random” subsample was obtained by telephone 
interviews drawn randomly from lists of telephone exchanges in the relevant area; the other three 
CalPoly subsamples came ultimately from license plates observed on the highway and are 
                                            
7  Our sample’s median income is $46,250, whereas the average incomes in the two counties where our respondents 
lived were $36,189 and $39,729 in 1995, as estimated by the Population Research Unit of the California Department 
of Finance. 
8 Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the year 2000 record the mean hourly wage rate by 
occupation for residents of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. We combine the BLS occupational categories 
into six groups that match our survey question about occupation, and assign to each person in our sample the 
average BLS wage rate for that person’s occupational group. We then add 10 percent to reflect the higher wages 
likely to be attracting these people to jobs that are relatively far away. 8 
   
therefore choice-based (some were purposely carpool-enriched). Even in the CalPoly “Random” 
subsample, however, the combined carpool shares are considerably higher (24%) than in the 
Brookings RP sample (6%), despite both being obtained from random telephone calls. The 
CalPoly Random shares are much closer to the observed peak-period carpool shares on the SR91 
roadway (Sullivan et al. 2000), so we conclude that the Brookings sample undersampled people 
who carpool — possibly because the telephone screening questions to determine eligibility for 
the survey were originally designed to only find solo drivers and subsequently modified.   Thus, 
we use the CalPoly Random subsample as our measure of the population choice shares, and 
correct for choice-based sampling in our estimates by applying carpool-share weights to the 
other subsamples (Manski and Lerman 1977). 
We recognize that SR91 has a higher share of carpoolers than most other highways in the 
nation have.  Later we perform sensitivity analysis on the share of carpoolers to explore how our 
analysis applies to other metropolitan areas.  
 
Specification and estimation 
We posit that motorists’ joint choices are influenced by their socioeconomic 
characteristics and the characteristics of their journey, including the total trip distance and the 
toll, travel time, and (un)reliability of travel time on the portion of the journey where a lane 
choice exists. 
The express lane toll for a given trip is the published toll for the time of day the motorist 
reported passing the sign that indicates the toll level. It is discounted by 50% if the trip was in a 
carpool of three or more.  (We asked respondents, even in the SP survey, to indicate their vehicle 
occupancy for actual trips.)  
Our ability to measure individuals’ preferences depends critically on capturing the 
different conditions they face when traveling at different times of day. Therefore, we sought to 
measure those conditions carefully to construct variables for the RP portion of the analysis.  We 
measured the reliability of service encountered by a traveler, as well as the travel time itself, by 
taking field measurements at many different times on eleven different days, corresponding 
approximately to the travel periods covered by our surveys.  The field measurements consist of 
travel times clocked by students attending the University of California, Irvine, who drove the 
road repeatedly. Thus we were able to measure the median travel time observed across the eleven 9 
   
days, at any given time of day, as well as the entire distribution of travel times across those days, 
again as a function of the time of day. For our travel-time variable, whose coefficient is β
Time in 
equation (4), we use the median value; for our measure of unreliability of travel time, denoted 
Rel in (5), we use the difference between the 80
th and 50
th percentiles of the distribution of travel 
times across days.  This measure captures the behavioral notion that people are more concerned 
with unexpected late arrivals than early arrivals; the measure also is less closely correlated with 
median travel time than a symmetric measure of dispersion such as the variance. Small, Winston, 
and Yan (2005b) discuss the procedures used to estimate these measures and to validate their 
accuracy. 
The variables describing the individual include age, sex, household size, per-capita 
income, total trip distance, and trip purpose (viz. a dummy for work trip).  We explored other 
variables describing arrival-time flexibility, occupation, education, and size of the workplace, but 
found that they have little explanatory power and that omitting them did not materially influence 
the other parameter estimates. 
The variables used in the SP analysis are defined, with one exception, identically to those 
in the RP data set—although the travel descriptors are of course generated differently, being 
specified in the survey questions instead of measured in the field. The one exception is 
reliability. We did not think we could explain percentiles of a probability distribution to survey 
respondents, so in the SP scenarios we described reliability as the frequency of being delayed 10 
minutes or more; we convert the responses into probabilities for purposes of analysis. The 
reliability variable therefore has different units and meaning in the RP and SP scenarios, so 
distinct RP and SP coefficients for it are estimated; however it is the RP coefficients that we use 
to describe resulting values of reliability and to simulate policy scenarios. 
A number of specification issues arise when we combine the RP and SP data sets.  The 
RP analysis is described by equations (1)-(3), to which we append superscript RP to distinguish 
those observations. The SP analysis, however, is different because we asked each respondent to 
express only a choice between the express or regular lanes; and we asked for this choice in eight 
different scenarios (each with different hypothetical values of travel variables). Because the SP 
choice is binary, it is convenient in the case of SP respondents to replace (1) by the utility 
difference between the express and regular lane. Thus in each choice scenario t, the respondent 
nchooses the express lane if and only if 10 
   








nt X U ε β ,     (6) 
with 
SP
n β  given by (2) with the addition of SP superscripts on each of the symbols there. Note 
that 
SP
n β , representing the preferences of individual n, does not vary across the different choice 
scenarios t presented to that individual. 
We account for three additional effects that may arise due to the nature of the SP sample 
and to combining it with the RP samples.  First, we expect the random influence 
SP
nt ε  to exhibit a 
typical panel structure. That is, it contains one random term, which we denote ξn, common to all 
the choice scenarios considered by individual n; and another, denoted 
SP
nt η , that is unique to each 
choice scenario. Second, in the 55 cases where the same individual answered both the RP and SP 
questions, we expect some correspondence between the unobserved influences on their actual 
behavior and their hypothetical responses. To capture this, we assume that part of the random 
utility is common between them.  Specifically, we assume the SP error 
SP
nt ε , expressing random 
preference for the express lane as revealed in SP responses, contains a term proportional to 
X
n ν  
from equation (3), representing random preference for travel in the express lane as revealed in 
observed (RP) behavior.  Accounting for both of these effects results in the SP error in equation 
(6) given by: 






nt η θν ξ ε + + =         ( 7 )  
where  n ξ  is normally distributed with zero mean and variance normalized to one; θ is a 
parameter to be estimated; and 
SP
nt η  has a logistic distribution with standard deviation σ
SP.
9 
Finally, we follow standard practice in combining RP and SP data by allowing for 
differences between revealed and stated choices in the variance of random preferences. That is, 
the random factors affecting revealed choices may be larger or smaller than those affecting stated 
choices. For similar reasons, we allow for a difference between the two RP data sets in the 
variance of the random term in equation (1).  The two data sets are Brookings RP (denoted BR) 
and CalPoly (denoted C).  Thus the three standard deviations describing the three parts of our 
                                            
9 The logistic distribution describes the difference between two extreme-value variates, which is what we obtain 
because utility in (6) is the difference between the random utilities of express and regular lanes.   Train (2003), p. 39 
illustrates this point.   
 11 
   







The ratios are described in our estimation results as “scale parameters”.
10 
We compute the log-likelihood function for our sample as the summation of logarithms 
of choice probabilities for RP observations (choice among nine alternatives) and for SP 
observations (binary choice), with the common error term 
X
n ν  entering both RP and SP choices 
for those people who are members of both Brookings samples.  As noted, each choice probability 
is expressed in the usual manner for mixed logit as an integral of a multinomial or binary logit 
probability, conditional on normal random variates, over the distribution of those variates.  We 
obtain parameter estimates by maximizing this log-likelihood function using Monte Carlo 




Every statistical model must make explicit or implicit “identifying assumptions” about 
which environmental factors are held constant as others are varied, thus enabling the analyst to 
isolate the parameters of interest.  Our model’s parameters are identified by assuming that the 
unobserved influences on transponder, vehicle occupancy, and lane choice do not vary 
systematically by time of day; if they did, they would be correlated with the cost, time, and 
reliability of travel and their presence would bias those coefficients.  The validity of this 
assumption depends to a large extent on how well our observed variables capture taste variation 
across time of day.  Fortunately, it appears that such variation is reflected in several of our 
variables.  For example, a motorists’ sex is correlated with the time of day of travel: females 
constitute only 15% of those people traveling during the interval 4:00-5:00 am, but 39% of the 
7:00-8:00 am group.  Similarly, the proportion of respondents whose trips are work trips varies 
from 100% at the earliest time to 58% at the latest time.  
In Small, Winston, and Yan (2005a), we conducted a formal test of whether unobserved 
taste variation by time of day affects our estimates of cost and travel-time coefficients.  The test 
consisted of estimating models of lane choice that included five time-of-day dummy variables.  
                                            
10 As in the binary logit model, one of these standard deviations can be normalized, typically by setting it equal to 
π/√3 for mathematical convenience: Train (2003), pp. 44-46. We normalize σ
SP in this way. 
11 This is the maximum simulated likelihood estimator developed by Lee (1992) and McFadden and Train (2000) 
and exposited by Train (2003), pp. 148-149. 
 12 
   
The findings indicated that values of time and reliability were not affected very much by the 
inclusion of the dummy variables. We do not include the time-of-day dummies in the current 
model because in the previous work they reduced the precision of the estimates. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.  We group the RP parameters as those for 
generic variables that influence all three choice dimensions (transponder, lane, and vehicle 
occupancy), and those that influence just one of those dimensions. We also group separately 
those parameters influencing only the SP lane choice and those having a common effect on RP 
and SP choices.
12  Most influences are statistically significant and have the expected signs.  As 
indicated by the generic RP coefficients and the SP coefficients, motorists pay close attention to 
the toll, travel time, and reliability when choosing among the available alternatives. 
Observed heterogeneity in preferences is indicated by “interaction variables” formed by 
multiplying a generic variable by a socioeconomic or distance variable.
13  For example, toll is 
multiplied by a dummy variable for income, and median travel time is multiplied by various 
functions of trip distance.  The results show that, as expected, motorists with higher incomes are 
less responsive to the toll, a statistically significant effect for RP respondents. The deterrent 
effect of travel time varies with distance in an inverted U pattern, initially rising but then falling 
for trips greater than 32 miles.  Following Calfee and Winston (1998), we conjecture that this 
pattern results from two opposing forces: the increasing scarcity of leisure time as commuting 
becomes longer, and the self-selection of people with lower values of time into farther out 
residences.  For SP, we allow the coefficient on travel time to differ between people with long 
and short commutes, but we find the difference to be negligible.  
We also find observed heterogeneity in alternative-specific preferences.  The estimates 
listed under “RP Coefficients” in the table show that middle-aged females and commuters are 
more inclined than other motorists to acquire a transponder. Middle-aged females with large 
                                            
12 We conducted an extensive exploration of alternative specifications and functional forms for the explanatory 
variables, including removing the equality constraints between certain RP and SP parameters reflected in the 
“combined estimates” in the table. The model presented here is robust to such variations and is not rejected by 
statistical tests against more general models. 
13 That is, we multiply a component of variable vector Xjn in equation (1) by a component of variable vector Wn in 
equation (2), as required by substituting (2) into (1). The resulting coefficient is a component of parameter vector γ 
in (2). 13 
   
families are more likely than other motorists to carpool, perhaps because they are more likely to 
make trips where family members ride together.  Finally, as indicated by the “Combined 
Coefficients,” women, middle-aged motorists, and motorists in smaller households are more 
likely than others to choose the toll lanes, even after accounting for differences in transponder 
acquisition and car occupancy.
14 
Substantial unobserved heterogeneity in preferences over travel characteristics is 
indicated by the size and statistical significance of the estimated standard deviations σ
Time and 
σ
Rel. Similarly, there is unobserved heterogeneity over absolute preferences for the express lanes 
(σ
X-RP) and for carpooling (σ
HOV).  We tried also to estimate a random coefficient for the toll, but 
we were unable to obtain stable results. The standard deviations are estimated with good 
precision and are substantial in magnitude, ranging from roughly one-fourth of the corresponding 
mean coefficient to a multiple of it.
15  The scale and correlation parameters that describe the 
error structure are also estimated precisely and show, among other things, that the RP and SP 
responses from a single individual are strongly correlated.  
We use our parameter estimates to compute properties of the distributions across 
individuals of motorists’ implied value of time (VOT) and reliability (VOR).
16  In table 4, we 
provide summaries for all road users combined and for users of the express lanes and the free 
lanes separately.  We use the Brookings RP sample for enumeration because it best represents 
the population, as argued previously.  (There is no bias from choice-based sampling here because 
we use information only about respondents’ characteristics, not their choices.)  We characterize 
heterogeneity in VOT and VOR by the interquartile range (i.e., the difference between the 75
th 
and 25
th percentile values) across individuals and across values of random parameters; this 
measure is relatively robust to the high upper tails typically found in distributions of ratios of 
random variables.  The results are obtained by sampling across people in the enumeration sample 
                                            
14 To better understand why women are more likely to use the toll lanes, we tried including an interaction of four 
variables: gender, age, household size, and either the express-lane dummy or the travel-time-uncertainty variable. 
This interaction sought to test whether working mothers with children might prefer the toll lanes or be more averse 
to unreliability due to tighter schedules. However, we could not find a measurable effect. 
15 The ratio of standard deviation to the mean coefficient is directly estimated for (un)reliability at 1.32.  In the case 
of travel time, the estimated standard deviation of 0.39 may be compared with the SP coefficient of travel time of 
about -0.36 and with the derivative of utility with respect to RP median travel time, which is -0.76 at the mean trip 
distance of the Brookings RP sample.   
16 These computations use the individual estimates for RP responses, which are derived according to (3) from the 
estimates of the mean coefficients from the section “RP Coefficients: Generic Variables” in Table 3 and from the 14 
   
and, for each, making repeated random draws from all estimated distributions; the same method 
is used, and described in greater detail, by Small, Winston, and Yan (2005a). 
All of the 90% confidence intervals in the second column are strictly positive, which 
indicates that all the reported estimates are statistically different from zero using a one-sided test 
at a five percent significance level.  We find that the median value of time is $19.63/hour, which 
is about 85% of the average wage rate and thus near the upper end of the range expected from 
previous work (Small 1992, pp. 43-45).  The median value of reliability is $20.76/hour.
17 
Motorists also exhibit a wide range of preferences for speedy and reliable travel, as total 
heterogeneity in VOT and VOR is nearly equal to, or greater than, the corresponding median 
value.  On average, express-lane users have higher values of travel time and reliability than do 
users of the free lanes—as expected—but wide and overlapping ranges exist within these two 
groups, resulting from the strong heterogeneity in preferences. 
 
5. Simulating Highway Policies 
We explore the policy implications of preference heterogeneity by developing a 
simulation model that uses our econometric results. It allows us to examine current HOT and 
HOV policies and alternative pricing policies. We begin with a situation closely resembling the 
SR91 road-pricing experiment. Two 10-mile roadways, Express and Regular, are assumed to 
connect the same origin and destination and to have the same free-flow travel time of 8.0 
minutes.
18  We model a four-hour peak period of 5:00-9:00 a.m. 
We find equilibria by iterating between the supply and demand sides of the model. The 
supply side is a standard static congestion model in which travel delays are proportional to the 
fourth power of the volume-capacity ratio (US Bureau of Public Roads 1964).  Capacity is 2,000 
vehicles per hour per lane.  Unreliability is assumed to be a constant fraction 0.3785 of travel 
delay (travel time minus free-flow travel time) — the fraction observed in our data on the free 
lanes averaged over 5-9 a.m. 
                                                                                                                                             
estimates of standard deviations from the section “Combined Coefficients”. Note that the latter estimates make use 
of both RP and SP responses. 
17 Note that reliability is measured in hours because it is formed from percentiles of the distribution of travel time —
which is measured in hours.  Nevertheless reliability, like travel time, is a property of the entire trip (more precisely, 
of the portion of the trip occurring on the section of the corridor we study). 
18 This is the observed travel time on the section we study at 4:00 a.m., corresponding to a speed of 75 miles per 
hour. 15 
   
The demand side is obtained from the estimated demand model by sample enumeration, 
using the Brookings RP sample which, as noted, is random and mostly representative of the 
population.  The enumeration sample is assumed to represent a fixed population of size N 
potential commuters. 
Our estimated demand model, of course, is conditional on travel in this corridor. 
However, we want to include the possibility of individuals altering their decision to travel in the 
corridor in response to policies we simulate, because other studies have shown that such 
responses can strongly affect the relative benefits of alternative pricing strategies (Verhoef, 
Nijkamp, and Rietveld 1996).  Therefore we extend our estimated model by adding an “outside 
choice” representing non-travel (on the corridor). 
The full procedure for this extension is described in the Appendix. Briefly, we postulate 
an “outside” or “non-travel” alternative labeled -1 (which could represent no trip, a trip outside 
the four-hour time period, or a trip on one of the other corridors that are some distance from the 
one we are modeling).  Its utility is simply a constant  1 − δ  plus a random term η-1,n. The random 
terms for the other alternatives, i.e., the terms ηjn in equation (3), are assumed to be more closely 
correlated with each other than with η-1, just like in a nested logit model; a new parameter λ 
indicates the strength of this correlation. Choice probabilities (conditional on random 
parameters) are nested logit.
19  
 
Calibrating the expanded demand model 
To use our model for simulation, we need to calibrate three parameters: the alternative-
specific constant for the outside choice ( 1 − δ ), the coefficient of the inclusive value of travel (λ), 
and the population size (N).  Because we expect the travel alternatives to be much closer 
substitutes for each other than for non-travel, we choose λ as small as possible without causing 
numerical instability: namely, λ=0.2. This choice does not seem to have much effect on the 
nature of the results. We calibrate the other two parameters ( 1 − δ  and N) to replicate observed 
traffic conditions during the morning peak on SR91 in the summer of 2000, which took place 
with an express-lane toll of $3.30 with 50% discount for HOV3.  The key traffic conditions are a 
travel-time difference between the express and the free lanes of 3.4 minutes (according to our 
                                            
19 The choice probabilities are expressed in the appendix equations (A.2a-d). 16 
   
field measurements), and non-travel share of 10%.
20  The parameters that achieve these results 
are shown in the first column of numbers in Table 5, along with the resulting travel times and the 
implied elasticity of traffic volume with respect to the full cost of travel.
21 The middle column 
shows the travel times produced by simulating the base (No-toll) policy with those parameters: 
namely 12.03 minutes, indicating a speed of 50 miles per hour. 
We recognize, however, that most areas considering new pricing or express-lane policies 
have far worse congestion than was observed on SR91 in 2000 —which was only five years after 
a 50 percent increase in the road’s capacity.  We therefore raise population N enough to reduce 
average speed to 30 miles per hour under a no-toll scenario.  In setting the parameters for this 
starting situation, we hold constant not  1 − δ  but instead the total traffic elasticity under a no-toll 
situation, shown in the last row. That elasticity (-0.36) may be compared with the value of -0.58 
estimated under the actual pricing scheme in effect on SR91 in 2000, based on the CalPoly data 
and using a model with no heterogeneity (Yan, Small, and Sullivan 2002). 
The calibration exercise just described leads finally to the parameters shown in the last 
column of the table, which we use in our policy simulations.  We perform sensitivity tests, 




  Based on our equilibrium model of supply and demand, we simulate results for several 
pricing and operational policies.  For each, we calculate tolls, travel times, traffic volumes, 
revenue, changes in consumers’ surplus, and total change in social welfare.  In our base-case or 
“no-toll” policy, the two roadways are not distinguished.  We compare policy scenarios that have 
                                            
20 The 10% figure is a plausible estimate based on the likelihood that a small portion of trips were foregone due to 
congestion, that an alternative route available for some travelers (SR241) had about 8%-9% share of the CalPoly 
sample, and that the share of public transit is less than 1%.   
21 Full cost is toll plus the traveler’s value of travel time and unreliability faced. We computed the full-cost elasticity 
by using our expanded demand model, with initial calibrated parameters just described, to simulate changes in total 
travel under a no-toll scenario and under a scenario where travel time and reliability are both increased 10 percent 
for all alternatives. We also computed the implied money-price elasticity of express-lane travel, which is -1.12, for 
comparison to the value of the same quantity reported in Yan, Small, and Sullivan (2002), which is -0.7 to -0.8 but 
based on a model that did not account for preference heterogeneity. We believe the higher elasticity calculated here 
is realistic because preference heterogeneity creates a subset of people who are quite ready to shift into or out of the 
express lanes in response to tolls, even though they are not very likely to shift from travel to non-travel. 
 17 
   
the same number of total lanes (six), and thus do not investigate whether the benefits of a 
particular policy would merit adding new lanes in order to implement it. 
The change in consumer surplus for traveler n, relative to the base case, is determined by the 
log-sum rule for nested logit (Choi and Moon 1997): 




CS λ δ exp exp ln
1
1 + ∆ = ∆ − ,                                     (8) 
where ∆ indicates the difference between a given scenario and the base scenario, In is the inclusive 
value of the nine travel alternatives, and mn is the individual’s marginal utility of income, 
determined from the coefficient of the toll variable using Roy’s identity.
22  The change in social 
welfare is the sum of expected changes in all individuals’ consumer surplus and in toll revenues. 
Besides the base policy (“No toll”), we first consider five other policies: 
• HOV:  a conventional “carpool-lane” policy in which the express lanes are open at no 
charge to carpools of two or more people; 
• HOT:  the express lanes are open both to carpools and to anyone willing to pay a toll; 
• One-route  toll:  the express lanes are open to anyone willing to pay a toll, but with no 
discount for carpools; 
• Two-route  toll:  all lanes are tolled, but with two different toll levels;  
• Two-route  HOT: same as Two-route toll except carpools can use either type of lane 
without charge. 
For those policies requiring a toll, the toll is chosen to maximize social welfare subject to the 
constraints that define the policy; in the case of the HOT lane, the resulting optimal toll is 
smaller than would be charged under criteria typically used in current implementations. 
The specific alternatives that are available for each policy are enumerated in Table 6.  
Because their availability varies across policies, we must consider a feature of welfare analysis 
using discrete choice models: namely, adding more options increases welfare beyond any 
improvement in travel conditions that may actually result. This feature derives from the nature of 
a random utility model that assumes there are unobservable characteristics, captured by εjn in (1), 
that differ among alternatives. We see from Table 6 that some of our policies offer options with 
                                            
22 The equation for In is given as equation (A.2c) in the Appendix. We report all results on a per-trip basis, so Roy’s 
identity equates mn to minus the coefficient of the toll. Based on the results of Table 3, mn = -(-2.4042+1.3869*Hn), 
where Hn represents a traveler’s value of the high household income dummy.  18 
   
or without a transponder, while others offer express lanes as well as regular lanes. Our demand 
model was estimated in a situation including all nine possible alternatives described earlier; but 
when we simulate other policies, certain of these alternatives are eliminated from the choice set. 
This affects expected utility because the unobservable characteristics of eliminated alternatives 
are valued by some travelers. For example, some travelers in a HOT-lane environment value the 
day-to-day flexibility of lane choice that owning a transponder provides, whereas they do not 
have such flexibility in the No-toll or HOV policies. 
 
6. Simulation Results 
Simulation results are presented in Table 7.  To facilitate understanding of the findings, 
we begin by presenting a detailed summary of the HOT-lane policy. The welfare-maximizing 
express toll for this policy is $9.23 per trip (first row). It produces a big reduction of travel times 
on the express lanes compared with the base policy (from 20.0 to 12.4 minutes), and a much 
smaller reduction on the general lanes (from 20.0 to 19.2 minutes). The next set of numbers 
gives the shares of selected combinations of alternatives (in which the shares for alternatives 
with and without a transponder are added together). Thus, for example, 3.4 percent of the N 
potential travelers choose not to travel on this corridor; just 2.6 percent pay the toll in order to 
travel alone on the express lanes (alternative TX1); and 52.5 percent travel alone in the general 
lanes (alternatives TG1 and NG1). 
The consumer-surplus change for this policy, relative to No toll, averages $2.01 per 
person—largely reflecting the reduced congestion caused by the shift to carpools (which is 
nearly as great as in the HOV policy, given that solo vehicles must pay a high express toll). The 
average, however, masks a wide dispersion in the gains to travelers, indicated by the percentiles 
shown next: the median traveler gets a $0.62 increase in consumer surplus, whereas the 75
th 
percentile traveler gets a much larger $2.71 while the 25
th percentile traveler gets only $0.26. 
Finally, the toll revenue collected from the HOT lane is just $0.24 per person, reflecting the 
small percentage paying the high toll. Adding the average consumer surplus change of $2.01 to 
the average toll revenue of $0.24 gives the total welfare change per person, $2.25, shown in the 
last row. 
We now compare the welfare properties of the policies.  The introduction of HOV lanes 
improves efficiency by encouraging carpooling—more than doubling its share from the base case 19 
   
(row labeled “All HOV”). This policy significantly reduces travel time on the express lanes, but 
leaves the general lanes very congested (third and fourth rows).  In all likelihood, the policy 
would be much less effective in a smaller metropolitan area: Dahlgren (1998) finds that HOV 
lanes are favorable (in terms of reducing total person delay) only when initial congestion is 
substantial (delays of 35 minutes or more) and when the initial modal share of carpools is sizable 
(20 percent or more). We explore the welfare properties of HOV lanes under these conditions 
when we perform sensitivity analysis.   
Allowing solo motorists to use the express lane if they pay a toll (HOT) generates a small 
welfare improvement over the HOV policy by enabling a small share of travelers to switch lanes 
and drive faster.  In the HOT-like policy without an HOV exemption (One-route toll), the 
general lane becomes even more congested and the welfare improvement over the initial HOV 
policy is negligible. The Two-route toll and Two-route HOT policies generate considerably more 
welfare gains, as expected. But they do so at the cost of imposing large consumer-surplus losses 
on many travelers: the distribution in the population shows that the “Two-route toll” reduces 
consumer surplus for three-fourths of all travelers (because the 75
th percentile traveler gains 
$0.00), while the “Two-route HOT” reduces it for between one-fourth and one-half of them 
(because the 25
th percentile gain is negative but the median gain is positive). 
Table 8 provides more perspective on the distributional effects of the policies by showing 
how consumer surplus varies between and within two different income groups. The dispersion 
within each group is quite large: for example, in the HOT policy the inter-quartile range is from 
$0.67 to $6.80 for the high-income group and from $0.22 to $2.10 for the low-income group.  
Note that these distributions show a great deal of overlap: for example, the one-quarter of the 
low-income group with the largest gains (i.e., those above the 75
th percentile) receive consumer 
surplus benefits of $2.10 or more, exceeding the gains of those at or below the median in the 
high-income group.  As indicated previously, such findings reflect the considerable 
heterogeneity in VOT, VOR, and alternative-specific preferences that we found even controlling 
for income.  Evidently there are many reasons besides income why some travelers strongly 
prefer one option over another. 
Notwithstanding their sacrifice of economic efficiency, variants of HOV, HOT, and One-
route pricing policies have attained a certain degree of public acceptance, suggesting that their 
distributional features are compelling enough to allow implementation.  The first-best policy of 20 
   
tolling both lanes (Two-route toll) produces a sizable gain in welfare over HOV and HOT 
policies, largely because it greatly reduces congestion on both lanes. However, it causes travelers 
to suffer high and disparate losses in consumer surplus, averaging $2.36 per trip and over $5.36 
per trip for one-fourth of all travelers.  Furthermore, the largest losses are associated with the 
lowest income groups, who tend to have the lowest values of time and reliability. These features 
obviously contribute to efficient pricing’s lack of political appeal.   
However, we find that policymakers can achieve most of the gains from first-best pricing, 
while partly addressing distributional concerns, by adding a carpool exemption to the Two-route 
pricing policy (making it “Two-route HOT”).
23  The carpool share, already high in two-route 
pricing because of its financial incentives, increases even more, while congestion on both routes 
compares with the levels under two-route pricing.  Remarkably, travelers on average obtain a 
substantial gain in consumer surplus ($0.98) from Two-route HOT (compared with no toll); 
nevertheless, the policy is vulnerable to the concern that a substantial fraction of people incur 
sizable losses — those in the most disadvantaged quartile of users lose at least $1.91 per trip. 
It is important to point out that if we assumed that travelers were homogeneous, our 
findings would change considerably, along the same lines as in Small and Yan (2001) and 
Verhoef and Small (2004).  With homogeneous preferences, the relative welfare gain from the 
one-route toll, whose efficiency relies mainly on creating differential services, would drop 
significantly; HOT would become nearly identical in effect to HOV (because no additional 
benefits would result from separating users based on their preferences); and the one-route toll 
would be set much lower (because it cannot rely on attracting users just from the upper tail of the 
VOT and VOR distributions).  In general, the reason that accounting for heterogeneity greatly 
affects policy comparisons is that diversity in users’ preferences creates the opportunity to 
improve social welfare by providing differentiated services. 
 
Toward a better policy compromise 
                                            
23 This policy, like others involving an express lane, incorporates the absolute preferences for the express lane from 
our demand model, which on average are slightly positive. For this reason, traffic is equilibrated when the express 
lane is slightly slower than the general lane, even though the express lane has a (moderately) higher price. While this 
may appear anomalous, it reflects other advantages of the express lanes on SR91, such as lack of trucks and 
intermediate entrances and exits, which we think would apply in many other express-lane applications. 
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Our findings on the distribution of benefits and costs raise the question of whether it is 
possible to craft a policy that achieves an even better compromise between efficiency and 
political feasibility than the policies explored thus far.   In particular, we seek a more efficient 
policy with the same attractive distributional features as the “One-route toll”. We choose “One-
route toll” as a benchmark for political feasibility because at least two cases exist in North 
America where a policy resembling it has been successfully implemented.  One case is SR91 
itself: although carpools did not all pay full fare on SR91, those with only two occupants did and 
those with three or more occupants paid half the fare during most of the time when the original 
private toll road was in operation.
24  The other case is Highway 407 in the Toronto area. This is a 
publicly built highway (later sold to a private firm) that runs through the suburbs paralleling, a 
few miles away, a very congested east-west route through the city known as Queen Elizabeth 
Way. Projects such as these, and several others being actively considered, suggest that the public 
is willing to tolerate a toll road without HOV exceptions if a free alternative is available. In our 
simulation of the One-route toll, the free alternative exists in the form of a roadway immediately 
adjacent to the priced one, so this policy should be at least as acceptable as Highway 407. 
We therefore quantify a benchmark for political viability as the 25
th percentile of 
consumer-surplus change experienced by travelers under the “One-route toll” policy.  Table 7 
shows that this is -$0.98 per trip. We then define an alternate version of two-route pricing that 
sets the two toll levels to maximize welfare, subject to the consumer surplus loss of the 25
th 
percentile traveler not exceeding $0.98 per trip.  The result is the “Limited two-route HOT” 
policy shown in the last column in Tables 7 and 8.  It results in a sharply differentiated toll: for 
the express lane its magnitude ($9.65) compares with that in the Two-route toll policy, but for 
the general lane it is only $1.90, much lower than either of the other two-route pricing policies. 
The policy achieves a general-lane speed of 36 miles per hour, intermediate between those of the 
no-toll and the two-route policies. It also achieves greater efficiency than any of the policies that 
leave the general lanes unpriced. 
                                            
24 Although there were complaints about the high tolls and about charging HOV3+ vehicles, they do not appear to 
have undermined the stability of the arrangement, which had a strikingly high acceptance level in various polls. 
What did eventually undermine the private operation was an unrelated issue: the franchise allowed the private 
operator to veto any capacity improvements in the corridor, which it did through a lawsuit in a highly publicized 
dispute with the California Department of Transportation. As a result, the express-lane franchise was purchased in 
2003 by a public agency, which has retained most of the toll policies of its private predecessor. 22 
   
Motorists in the “Limited two-route HOT” policy achieve a consumer surplus gain, on 
average, of $1.36 compared with no tolls. This exceeds the gain achieved by any other two-route 
pricing policy.  Furthermore, travelers are treated much more evenly than in the other two-route 
pricing policies, with the inter-quartile range only modestly greater than with HOT or HOV. 
Thus, the Limited two-route HOT policy succeeds in improving efficiency more than most other 
policies, while maintaining the attractive distributional characteristics comparable to policies that 
have been found to be political feasible. 
We stress that our policy simulations are based on an experiment concerning only a 
single ten-mile stretch of highway. Most significant congestion affects a much broader region.  If 
the distributional advantages of differentiated pricing enable it to be broadly adopted, its welfare 
gains will be greatly magnified.       
 
Sensitivity analysis for simulation results 
The simulation results presented so far are based on a full-cost elasticity for total traffic 
of -0.36.  Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix present simulation results where we assume the 
full-cost elasticity of total corridor traffic is -0.60 and zero, respectively. For the case of zero 
elasticity, the model has no outside option and so there is no parameter  1 − δ  to calibrate. In the 
other case, the two parameters N and  1 − δ  are simultaneously calibrated, as in the main results, to 
achieve the desired elasticity and travel-time differential with no toll. The results show that the 
welfare rankings of various policies, and the nature of their distributional impacts, do not depend 
on this assumed elasticity. We caution that specific numerical results are not necessarily 
comparable with different assumed elasticities because they imply different starting shares for 
HOV.  
A more important area for sensitivity analysis, in our view, is varying the initial carpool 
share.  As noted, many metropolitan areas have much smaller carpool shares than Los Angeles, 
with its large size and relatively long work trips. We therefore present an alternate simulation in 
which we change the parameters governing the alternative-specific utilities for HOV alternatives 
so as to produce HOV shares about half those of our primary scenario (Table 7), under both the 
no-toll and HOV policies.
25  Results are shown in Table 9.  The policies do not perform as well 
                                            
25 We do this by adjusting: the HOV dummy and its standard deviation. (The HOV3 dummy is adjusted 
proportionally to the HOV dummy.) The HOV share can be estimated approximately for about 20 existing corridors 23 
   
as those in our main simulation, either in total welfare gain or in direct impact on consumers.  
For example, the median consumer-surplus change is uniformly negative. The smaller efficiency 
gains and less favorable distributional properties occur because the policies cannot induce as 
much carpool formation and therefore they achieve less relief from congestion. The HOV policy, 
especially, is much less effective—it produces a negative total welfare change and substantial 
consumer surplus losses both to the median and, especially, the 25
th percentile traveler.  This 
striking finding is consistent with policymakers’ growing dissatisfaction with HOV lanes and 
growing interest in HOT lanes throughout the country. 
What about the “Limited two-route HOT” policy?  Can it outperform HOT?  Although 
we found that it cannot meet its political acceptability, as indicated by HOT’s 25
th percentile 
consumer surplus loss, it can improve on HOT’s efficiency if we define political acceptability 
relative to the 25
th percentile consumer-surplus loss of HOV instead. Thus, the possibility for an 
improved policy compromise exists for other metropolitan areas in the country, although we 
cannot be as sanguine about political feasibility as before.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Methodological advances in microeconometrics have enriched our understanding of 
consumer behavior by recognizing that consumers are not homogeneous.  Applications have 
shown that accounting for heterogeneity is important when assessing policies in many domains, 
such as economic deregulation, job training, and poverty programs. We find that heterogeneity 
plays a similarly important role in policy toward highway transportation. Accounting for it 
creates the opportunity not only to introduce HOT lanes, as has been previously recognized, but 
to introduce more far-reaching pricing policies within the limits of distributional effects that 
appear to be politically acceptable in certain circumstances.  We have been able to design a 
differentiated road-pricing scheme that fills in the gap between optimal but socially unpopular 
first-best pricing and pragmatic but less efficient policies like carpool or HOT lanes.  
Recent experiments have shown that policymakers are no longer unwilling to use the 
price mechanism to allocate scarce road capacity.  The changing times give cause for optimism 
                                                                                                                                             
with HOV lanes in US metropolitan areas from data in Pratt et al. (2000), Tables 2-2, 2-7, and 2-9; almost all are 
between 15% and 30%, whose midpoint (22.5%) is almost exactly half the share predicted by our HOV policy 
simulation in Table 7. 24 
   
that more efficient policies, offering choices that appeal to diverse users, will become serious 
candidates for implementation. 25 




  Value or Fraction of Sample 
 Cal  Poly-RP  Brookings-RP  Brookings-SP 
Age  (years):     
     <30  0.11  0.12  0.10 
     30-50  0.62  0.62  0.64 
Household Income ($/year):       
     <60,000  0.38  0.83  0.83 
     >60,000  0.62  0.17  0.17 
Female  Dummy  0.32 0.37 0.37 
Mean Actual Trip Distance (Miles)  34.2  44.8  42.6 
Number of Respondents  435  79  78 







Choice Shares of Calpoly and Brookings RP Samples 
 
Calpoly Sample  Alter-














































































carpool  24 31 34  28 6 
No. of 
Obs.  201 191 58 18 79 
Legend:  
Transponder acquisition: N=No, T=yes 
Lane: G=General (free) lane, X=Express lane.  
Car occupancy: 1=solo, 2=HOV2, 3=HOV3+ 
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Table 3  












b, c × dummy for high household income (> $60K) 
Median travel time (min.) 
b × trip distance (units of 10 miles) 
Median travel time 
b × trip distance squared 
Median travel time 
b × trip distance cubed 




Transponder dummy× Brookings dummy 
Transponder dummy × Calpoly dummy 
Female dummy × age30-50 dummy × transponder dummy 
Commute dummy × transponder dummy 




Express lane dummy × Brookings dummy 
Express lane dummy × Calpoly dummy 




Carpool dummy × Brookings dummy 
Carpool dummy × Calpoly dummy 
Female × age30-50 × household size × carpool 
HOV3 dummy × Brookings dummy 
HOV3 dummy × Calpoly dummy 





Express lane dummy 





b, c × dummy for high household income (> $60K) 
Travel time (min.) 
b × long commute dummy (> 45 minutes) 
Travel time 







-2.4042  (0.3994) 
1.3869  (0.3395) 
-0.5753  (0.1751) 
0.1128  (0.0394) 
-0.0050  (0.0020) 
-0.7489  (0.2668) 
 
 
-2.0101  (0.7472) 
-3.6342  (0.7374) 
1.8535  (0.7979) 
1.2502  (0.6967) 
0.3276  (0.9422) 
 
 
0.2564  (1.1386) 
0.2264  (1.1691) 
3.7879  (0.8261) 
 
 
-11.5192  (1.0339) 
-11.6719  (0.8883) 
1.4404  (0.3563) 
-9.2262  (0.9886) 
-7.4263  (0.9909) 




-3.0651  (1.1953) 
1.0530  (0.5237) 
-1.4165  (0.3028) 
-0.2492  (0.4808) 
-0.3538  (0.0812) 
-0.3843  (0.0616) 
-7.1139  (1.4507) 
 27 
   
 




Female dummy × express lane dummy 
Age30-50 dummy × express lane dummy 
Household size (number of people) × express lane dummy 
Standard deviation of travel-time coefficient (σ
Time) 
Ratio of std. dev. to mean of coefficient of travel-time uncertainty 




Correlation parameter between RP and SP express lane choice (θ) 
 
Parameters associated with scaling 
 
Scale parameter: Calpoly sample (τ
C) 








2.2434  (0.8384) 
1.9277  (0.7955) 
-0.7371  (0.2117) 
0.3866  (0.0694) 
1.3233  (0.3805) 
 




0.4143  (0.0902) 
0.6064  (0.2029) 
 
Number of observations 







a Standard errors reported are the “sandwich” estimate of standard errors from Lee (1995). That is, each is the square 
root of the corresponding diagonal element in the matrix  ( ) ( )
1 1 ˆ − − − − = H P H V , where H is the Hessian of the 
simulated log-likelihood function and P is the outer product of its gradient vector (both calculated numerically). This 
estimate accounts for the simulation error in the likelihood function. 
 
b All cost, travel-time, and unreliability variables are entered as the difference between values for toll and free lanes. 
In the RP data, the cost for free lanes is zero, travel time for toll lanes is 8 minutes, and unreliability for toll lanes is 
zero. In the SP data, cost, travel time, and unreliability are specified in the questions. 
 
c Value of “cost” for the toll lanes is the posted toll for a solo driver (for RP data) or the listed toll in the survey 
question (for SP), less 50% discount if car occupancy is 3 or more. For SP, car occupancy is determined from a 
question asking whether the respondent answered as a solo driver or as part of a carpool, and if the latter what size 
carpool. 
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Table 4 








Value of time ($/hour)
a    
Median for: 
    Entire sample 
    Express lane users 











    Entire sample 
    Express lane users   














    Entire sample 
    Express lane users 











    Entire sample 
    Express lane users   











a Calculated from Equations (4) and (5) using estimates of 
Time
n β , 
l
n
Re β , and 
Cost
n β  applicable to RP responses (but 
note those estimates rely on both RP and SP data because they depend on 
Time σ  and 
l Re σ ). 
b Heterogeneity is expressed here as the inter-quartile range of the quantity in question across both individuals in the 
enumeration sample and random draws from the estimated distributions of the β’s, in order to account for observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively.29 
   
Table 5 
Initial Calibration 
  Summer 2000 conditions    More congested 
conditions 




 No-toll  policy 
Assumed toll:
a 
     Express lanes 











     N 










Travel time (min.): 
     Express lanes 










Arc elasticity of total corridor traffic 
volume with respect to full cost




 a  HOV3+ pays half of the toll. 
 


























   
Table 6 


















0 Solo  N  G  x  x   
1 Solo  T  G    x  x 
2 Solo  T  X 
x 
 x  x 
3 HOV2  N  G  x  x   
4 HOV2  T  G    x  x 
5a HOV2  N  X  x     
5b HOV2  T  X 
x 
 x  x 
6 HOV3  N  G  x  x   
7a HOV3  T  G    x  x 
7b HOV3  N  X  x     
8 HOV3  T  X 
x 
 x  x 
 
Note: x means that the alternative is available in that scenario. T indicates a transponder, N indicates none. G 
indicates the general lanes; X the express lanes. 
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Table 7 
Policy Simulation Results 
a In the HOT and One-route toll policies, this row combines shares for two alternatives, with and without a 
transponder: namely, alternatives 3 and 4 in Table 6. 
a Same as not a, but combines alternatives 6 and 7 in Table 6. 
c Consumer surplus and social welfare are measured relative to the no-toll scenario. They and toll revenue are each 














HOV HOT  One-
route 










Toll on Express Lane 















Travel times (min.): 
  Express Lane 






















Aggregated choice shares (%): 
  No travel on corridor 
  Solo on Express Lane 
  Solo on General Lane 
  HOV2 on Express Lane 
  HOV2 on General Lane
a 
  HOV3+ on Express Lane 
  HOV3+ on General Lane
b 
  All HOV3+ 







































































Consumer surplus change 
($/person)
c:             
Average 
Distribution in population 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 





































c  $0 $0  $0.24 $1.64 $5.35 $1.81  $1.05 
Welfare change ($/person)
c  $0 $2.11 $2.25 $2.14  $2.99  $2.79  $2.41 32 
   
Table 8 
Consumer surplus distribution by income group ($/person) 
 No 
toll 
HOV HOT  One-
route 










High income (≥ 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 
     25%-ile 
  Low income (< 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 

























































   
Table 9 
Simulation Results with Low HOV Share 
Notes: See Table 7. 
 No  toll  HOV  HOT  One-
route 










Toll on Express Lane 







































Aggregated Choice shares (%): 
No travel on corridor 
 
Solo on Express Lane 
Solo on General Lane 
HOV2 on Express Lane 
HOV2 on General Lane 
HOV3 on Express Lane 









































































































Distribution in population 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 




































Toll revenue ($/person)  $0  $0  $1.18 $1.75 $6.44  $4.82  $2.38 
Welfare change ($/person)  $0  $-0.50 $1.59 $1.55 $2.22  $2.01  $1.71 34 
   
Appendix 
 
Stated Preference Survey Questionnaire 
  Eight hypothetical commuting scenarios were constructed for respondents who travel on 
SR91.  Respondents who indicated their actual commute was less (more) than 45 minutes were 
given scenarios that involved trips ranging from 20-40 (50-70) minutes.  An illustrative scenario 
follows: 
 
Free Lanes  Express Lanes 
Usual Travel Time: 
25 minutes 






Frequency of Unexpected Delays 
of 10 minutes or more: 
1 day in 5 
Frequency of Unexpected Delays 
of 10 minutes or more: 
1 day in 20 
Your Choice (check one): 
Free Lanes    Toll Lanes  
 
 
Extended Demand Model for Simulations 
Let Ω={-1,0,1,…,8} denote the choice set for a potential road user, where alternative -1 
is the outside choice and alternatives 0–8 represent the different combinations of routes, 
transponder acquisition, and car occupancy defined previously. It is convenient to let 
Ω ~ ={0,1,…,8} denote the subset of choices involving travel on the corridor. 
The utility of individual n choosing alternative j is: 







j nj X U ε β + = ,  j≥0       ( A . 1 b )  
with 
RP
n β  and 
RP
jn ε  as given by equations (2)-(3). Thus each traveler’s utility for non-travel is 
divided into a mean  1 − δ , which is constant for all commuters, and random deviation  n 1 − ε ; 35 
   
whereas the utility for each alternative involving travel is the same as in the RP part of our 
estimated model (1)-(3). We henceforth omit the superscript RP for simplicity. 
The random preferences for individual n are therefore represented by the vector 
() n n n n µ ν η , , = Ψ , where () n n n n 8 0 1 ,..., , η η η η − = ,  ( )













Re ,µ µ µ = .  
The density function of Ψn is specified as  ( ) ( ) ( ) n n n n µ ν ρ η ρ ρ νµ η , ⋅ = Ψ ; here ρνµ(⋅) is a product of 
independent normal random variables with standard deviations as estimated, while ρn(⋅) takes the 
nested-logit form in which the outside alternative -1 is one nest and the travel alternatives Ω
~  are 
another nest with similarity parameter λ. This specification captures the idea that the substitution 
pattern between any two travel choices may be different from that between non-travel and travel.  
The market share of alternative  Ω ∈
~
j , within the sub-market represented by people with 
characteristics of traveler nin our enumeration sample, is found by integrating the nested-logit 
probability formula, conditional on random parameters νn and µn, over the distribution function 
of those random parameters: 
() () ( )
() ∫ ⋅ =
n n
n n
n n n n jn jn d S S
µ ν
νµ
µ ν µ ν µ ν ρ
,



























                (A.2b) 
is the share conditional on values of the normal random variates, and 







n jn n X I λ β         ( A . 2 c )    
is the inclusive value of travel choices. The non-travel share is 














− .         ( A . 2 d )  
   The total demand for an alternative j is therefore 
      ∑ =
n
jn n j S w D ,        ( A . 3 )  
where wn is the number of people represented by motorist n.  This number is just wn=N/79, where 
N is the total population size, since our enumeration sample consists of 79 equally-weighted 36 
   
individuals.  The traffic volume arising from those individuals who choose a travel alternative j 
involving occupancy Oj is Vj≡Dj/Oj. 
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Table A.1 
Alternate Simulation Results: Elasticity=-0.60 
Notes: See Table 7. 
 No  toll  HOV  HOT  One-





Toll on Express Lane 


































Aggregated choice shares (%): 
Outside choice 
 
Solo on Express Lane 
Solo on General Lane 
HOV2 on Express Lane 
HOV2 on General Lane 
HOV3 on Express Lane 












































































Consumer surplus change 
($/person relative to No Toll):
 
Average 
Distribution in population 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 











































Toll revenue ($/person)  $0  $0  $0.24 $1.40 $4.24  $1.63 
Welfare change ($/person)  $0 $1.50  $1.71 $1.86 $2.47  $2.13 
           
Consumer surplus distribution by 
income group ($/person) 
         
High income (≥ 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 
     25%-ile 
  Low income (< 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 

















































   
Table A.2 
Alternate Simulation Results: Elasticity=0 (no outside choice) 
Notes: See Table 7. 
 
 No  toll  HOV  HOT  One-





Toll on Express Lane 


































Aggregated choice shares (%): 
Outside choice 
 
Solo on Express Lane 
Solo on General Lane 
HOV2 on Express Lane 
HOV2 on General Lane 
HOV3 on Express Lane 












































































Consumer surplus change 
($/person relative to No Toll):
 
Average 
Distribution in population 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 











































Toll revenue ($/person)  $0  $0  $0.24 $1.40 $4.24  $1.63 
Welfare change ($/person)  $0 $1.50  $1.71 $1.86 $2.47  $2.13 
           
Consumer surplus distribution by 
income group ($/person) 
         
High income (≥ 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 
     25%-ile 
  Low income (< 60K) 
     75%-ile 
     50%-ile 
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